Introduction
The cost of generating electricity from renewable resources has declined dramatically over the past decade. As revealed by recent long-term power purchase agreements, the cost of wind power in particular now ranges from 2.5¢-4¢/kWh (including the impact of federal tax incentives) throughout much of the United States. At such levels, wind power is potentially competitive with new gas-fired generation, and utilities, regulators, and resource planners are beginning to compare wind to gas-fired generation on the basis of economics alone. A critical component of any such comparison, however, should be an assessment and quantification of the relative risks associated with renewable energy -both positive (e.g., reduced environmental compliance risk) and negative (e.g., resource intermittency). 1 This paper analyzes just one such risk: the ability of renewable generation to mitigate natural gas fuel price risk.
Against the backdrop of increasing -and increasingly volatile -natural gas prices, renewable energy resources, which by their nature are immune to natural gas fuel price risk, provide a potential economic benefit. Unlike many contracts for natural gas-fired electricity generation, renewable generation is typically sold under fixed-price contracts.
2 Assuming that electricity consumers value long-term price stability, a retail electricity supplier that is looking to expand its resource portfolio (or a policymaker interested in evaluating different resource options) should therefore compare the cost of fixed-price renewable generation to the hedged or guaranteed cost of natural gas-fired generation, rather than to projected costs based on uncertain gas price forecasts.
3 Nonetheless, utilities and others often compare the costs of renewable to gas-fired generation using as their fuel price input long-term gas price forecasts that are inherently uncertain, rather than long-term natural gas forward prices that can actually be locked in. This practice raises the critical question of how these two price streams -i.e., forwards and forecasts -compare.
Building on earlier work relating to fuel price risk (e.g., Awerbuch 1993 Awerbuch , 1994 Awerbuch , 2003 Kahn and Stoft 1993; Humphreys and McClain 2002) , in this paper we compare prices that can be locked in through long-term traditional gas-based hedging instruments (e.g., futures, swaps, and fixedprice physical supply contracts) to contemporaneous forecasts of spot natural gas prices, with the purpose of identifying any systematic differences between the two. Although our data are quite limited, we find that from November 2000 through 2003, forward gas prices for terms of 2-10 years have been considerably higher than most natural gas spot price forecasts. This difference is striking, and implies that resource planning and modeling exercises based on these forecasts over this period have yielded results that are biased (with respect to fuel price risk) in favor of gas-fired generation.
Although from a policy and analytic standpoint these empirical results are sufficiently interesting on their own, we spend the majority of this article examining several potential explanations for our empirical findings. Specifically, within the context of the extensive (though inconclusive) treatment of this subject within the literature, we first discuss the possibility that hedging is not costless. 4 We then consider the possibility that the forecasts we employ have been biased downwards, or that other data or sampling problems are driving the empirical premiums. We find none of these potential explanations to be either fully satisfying or easily refutable. Regardless of the explanation, however, the implications of our analysis remain the same: when comparing fixed-price renewable to variable-price gas-fired generation, forward gas prices are the most appropriate fuel price input if long-term price stability is valued.
Background
For better or worse, natural gas has become the fuel of choice for new power plants being built across the United States. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), natural gas combined-cycle and combustion turbine power plants accounted for 96% (138 GW out of 144 GW total) of the total generating capacity added in the U. S. between 1999 S. between and 2002 S. between (EIA 2003 . Looking ahead, the EIA expects that gas-fired technology will account for 61% of the 355 GW of new generating capacity projected to come on-line in the US through 2025, increasing the nationwide market share of gas-fired generation from 18% in 2002 to 22% in 2025 (EIA 2004) . While the data are specific to the US, natural gas-fired generation is making similar advances in other countries as well.
With increasing competition for dwindling domestic natural gas supplies, it is likely that gas prices will be as or more volatile than they have been in the past. Figure 1 shows first-nearby natural gas futures prices on a daily basis going back to the inception of trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in April 1990. While the "twin peaks" of December 2000 and February 2003 clearly dominate the graph and make the rest of the price history look comparatively tame, many of the "lesser" price spikes during the early 1990s represent doublings or more in price. As implied by Figure 1 , not only have gas prices increased in recent years, but so has gas price volatility. Figure 2 shows the annualized 90-day standard deviation of daily percentage changes in first-nearby gas futures prices, along with its one-year (i.e., 252-day) moving average to smooth out seasonality. As of early 2004, near-record-high volatility, combined with price levels that are more than double the historical average, meant that in absolute terms, an unprecedented number of dollars were at risk. This is particularly noteworthy considering that gas price volatility is a major contributor to wholesale electricity price volatility. The cost of natural gas accounts for more than half the levelized cost of energy from a new combined cycle gas turbine, and more than 90% of its operating costs (EIA 2001) . Moreover, gas-fired plants are often the marginal units that set the market-clearing price for all generators in a competitive wholesale market, allowing natural gas price volatility to flow directly through to wholesale electricity price volatility. Clearly, the variability of gas prices poses a major risk to both buyers and sellers of gas-fired generation.
Electricity can be bought and sold either (1) on the spot market, (2) through contracts that are indexed to (i.e., vary with) the price of the fuel input, 5 (3) through tolling agreements (whereby the power purchaser delivers fuel to the generator and takes delivery of the resulting power that is produced, having effectively "rented" the use of the generation plant), or (4) through fixedprice contracts. Natural gas-fired generation is commonly sold through all four of these contract types (Bachrach et al. 2003) , with gas price risk falling on the power purchaser in the first three, and the generator in the final type. Renewable generation, on the other hand, is typically sold through long-term fixed-price contracts (perhaps indexed to inflation), and generally imposes no gas price risk on either the buyer or seller. In order to achieve a fuel price risk profile similar to that of fixed-price renewable generation, either the buyer (under spot, indexed, and tolling contracts) or seller (under fixed-price contracts) of gas-fired generation must hedge away natural gas price risk.
To hedge natural gas price risk, a retail electricity supplier can either purchase renewable generation (which is immune to gas price risk), purchase variable-priced gas-fired generation and choose among a number of gas-based financial and physical hedging instruments, or purchase fixed-price gas-fired generation (in which case the generator may wish to hedge using financial or physical instruments).
6 Financial gas-based hedges include futures (or, more generically, forwards), swaps, options on futures, or some combination or derivation thereof (e.g., collars). Physical hedges include long-term fixed-price gas supply contracts and natural gas storage.
To fairly evaluate fixed-price renewable and variable-price gas-fired contracts on an apples-toapples basis with respect to fuel price risk, we must look to those gas-based hedging instruments that provide a hedged payout pattern similar to that of renewables -i.e., flat and symmetrical, immune to both gas price increases and decreases. Bolinger et al. (2003) demonstrate that such instruments include gas futures, swaps, and fixed-price physical supply contracts, but not options or storage. The prices that can be locked in through these instruments are therefore the appropriate fuel price input to modeling and planning studies that compare -either explicitly or implicitly -renewable to gas-fired generation (again, presuming that long-term price stability is valued).
As shown in Bolinger et al. (2003) , however, utilities and others conducting such analyses tend to rely primarily on uncertain long-term forecasts of spot natural gas prices, rather than on prices that can be locked in through futures, swap, or fixed-price physical supply contracts (i.e., "forward prices"). This practice raises a critical question: how do the prices contained in uncertain long-term gas price forecasts compare to actual forward prices that can be locked in?
If the two price streams closely match one another, then one might conclude that forecast-based resource acquisition, planning, and modeling exercises are implicitly accounting for the price stability benefits of renewable relative to gas-fired generation, approximating an apples-to-apples comparison. If, however, forward prices systematically differ from long-term price forecasts (e.g., if there is a cost to hedging, or if the forecasts are out of tune with market expectations), then the use of such forecasts in resource acquisition, planning, and modeling exercises will arguably yield results that are biased in favor of either renewable (if forwards < forecasts) or natural gas-fired generation (if forwards > forecasts).
Empirical Findings of a Premium

EIA Forecast Comparisons
We first investigate the extent to which natural gas forward prices match price forecasts by comparing the prices of futures, swap, and fixed-price physical gas supply contracts to "reference case" gas price forecasts from the EIA. The data necessary to conduct our analysis are deceptively simple: a forward gas price and a gas price forecast, ideally generated at the same time. While long-term gas price forecasts are relatively easy to come by (e.g., the EIA forecasts are publicly available and updated every fall), long-term forward prices -and in particular those of sufficient duration to be of interest -present a greater challenge. The NYMEX gas futures strip extends out six years (but is liquid for much less than that) -a period that is only about one-third as long as the typical term of a power purchase agreement for renewable energy (which commonly extend 15-25 years). Forward gas contracts in excess of 6 years are traded infrequently and, when traded, are traded bilaterally "over the counter" (i.e., not on an organized exchange), and are therefore rarely documented in the public domain. In addition, we must further restrict our sample to those forward prices that were traded or posted at roughly the same time as the generation of a long-term gas price forecast (this timing issue will be discussed later).
Thus, despite efforts to obtain a larger sample, our analysis is limited to comparisons based on publicly available data that we collected from November 2000-2003, and for forward price terms not exceeding 10 years. Specifically, our limited sample of natural gas forward contracts and price forecasts includes:
• 2-, 5-, and 10-year natural gas swaps offered by In each case, we evaluate these forward prices against the EIA's reference case forecast of natural gas prices delivered to electricity generators (in nominal dollars 7 ), which is generated in the fall of each year and presented in the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) series released towards the end of the year. Although the use of EIA reference case gas price forecasts for this purpose is somewhat controversial (as discussed later), we use them nonetheless because they are publicly available, have been widely vetted, and most importantly are commonly adopted by the EIA and others as a "base case" price scenario in policy evaluations, modeling exercises, and even resource acquisition decisions.
To make a direct comparison to the Enron swap and NYMEX futures prices, which are indexed to the Henry Hub in Louisiana, we would ideally want to use a forecast of Henry Hub spot prices, which the EIA does not provide. Instead, we estimated the average cost of transportation from the Henry Hub to electricity generators nationwide by comparing historic first-nearby NYMEX futures prices (which are indexed to Henry Hub) to delivered (to electricity generators) prices on a monthly basis from April 1990 through December 2002 (n=153 months).
8 This comparison revealed an average transportation margin of $0.38/MMBtu, with a 95% confidence interval that ranges from $0.33 to $0.43/MMBtu. To account for this transportation margin, and to place our EIA price forecasts on the same terms as our Enron and NYMEX forward prices, each year we subtracted $0.38/MMBtu from the EIA forecast of prices delivered to electricity generators.
The Williams/DWR contract, on the other hand, will result in delivery of natural gas to the Southern California Border, which requires consideration of the locational basis differential between prices in Southern California and at the Henry Hub. This basis differential has varied over time in both sign and magnitude. While it was strongly positive (i.e., prices in Southern California were sharply higher than at the Henry Hub) during the California energy crisis of 2000 and 2001, the basis has been consistently flat or slightly negative since late 2001. Furthermore, looking ahead, settlement prices of forward basis swaps posted on the NYMEX web site indicate that the Southern California-Henry Hub basis is projected to remain slightly negative over the coming 36 months.
Confronted with a wide range of possible basis values to choose from, we simply assume here that the basis between Southern California and the Henry Hub is flat (i.e., zero) over the duration of the Williams/DWR contract. This assumption appears to be consistent with, and perhaps even conservative relative to, historical post-crisis basis values (including at the time the contract was signed), as well as prices that can currently be locked in for the next 36 months through the forward market. Thus, we compare the Williams/DWR contract prices to the same adjusted EIA forecast -i.e., reference case prices delivered to generators, less $0.38/MMBtu -as we used for the Enron and NYMEX comparisons.
Each of these comparisons reveals that forward natural gas prices have traded above EIA reference case price forecasts during this four-year period, sometimes significantly so. Figure 3 consolidates the resulting levelized premiums (in terms of $/MMBtu and ¢/kWh, assuming a heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh) from each of these comparisons into a single graph.
9 As shown, the magnitude of the empirically derived premiums varies somewhat from year to year, contract to contract, and by contract term, ranging from $0.5-$0.8/MMBtu, or 0.4-0.6¢/kWh assuming a highly-efficient gas-fired power plant.
Figure 3. Implied Premiums in $/MMBtu and ¢/kWh (assuming 7,000 Btu/kWh)
While the relatively tight range of premiums is somewhat remarkable, the limitations in our data sample mean that one cannot easily extrapolate these findings beyond the four periods for which we have data, or to contract terms longer than those examined. Presuming that long-term price stability is valued, however, it is at least apparent that utilities and others who have conducted resource planning and modeling studies based on EIA reference case gas price forecasts from November 2000-2003 have produced "biased" results that favor variable-price gas-fired over fixed-price renewable generation, potentially to the tune of ~0.4-0.6¢/kWh on a levelized basis. This is because an apples-to-apples comparison of renewable to gas-fired generation would ideally be based on fuel prices that can be locked in with certainty, which, as shown in Figure 3 , have traded at a premium over uncertain fuel price forecasts during this period.
Other Forecasts
Given that they are publicly available, highly documented, and widely reviewed and used (even by utilities) in modeling exercises and resource planning processes throughout the country, EIA reference case gas price forecasts are a reasonable starting point for our purposes. The EIA's forecasts, however, are by no means the only long-term gas price forecasts available to market participants. Obviously, unless other gas price forecasts are in close agreement with EIA reference case forecasts, the spread between them and forward gas prices will be different from those shown in Figure 3 . 9 We derived the premiums by levelizing the first 2, 5, 6, 7, and 10 years of the EIA forecasts (using a discount rate of 10%) and subtracting the resulting levelized forecast price from the corresponding forward prices. Because in this case levelizing involves taking the present value of a price stream and amortizing it forward at the same discount rate, the calculation is relatively insensitive to the level of the discount rate chosen. For example, using a discount rate of 5% barely changed the results. In order to assess how the premiums presented in Figure 3 would change had we compared natural gas forward prices to some forecast other than the EIA's, we reviewed a number of other long-term gas price forecasts, sourced from the EIA's own forecast comparisons (contained in each year's AEO), as well as from various utility integrated resource plans. 10 As shown in Bolinger et al. (2003) , with few exceptions, the EIA reference case forecast has generally been higher -and often substantially so -than most other forecasts generated from 2000-2003 and used by utilities and others. These findings suggest that the premiums observed relative to the EIA reference case forecasts would be even larger when comparing forward prices to some of the other commonly used gas price forecasts.
For example, had we compared the November 2001 10-year natural gas swap to the gas price forecast contained in Idaho Power's 2002 Integrated Resource Plan, 11 we would have observed a 10-year levelized premium of $1.29/MMBtu -i.e., nearly twice as large as the $0.68/MMBtu benchmarked against the EIA reference case forecast. This translates to a 0.9¢/kWh premium at an aggressive heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh; had Idaho Power opted to use forward market data rather than forecast data in its integrated resource plan, comparisons between renewable and gasfired generation may have looked significantly different.
Though not as large in magnitude as the Idaho Power example, most other forecast comparisons yielded similar results, with the EIA reference case forecast exceeding the non-EIA forecast. Utilities and others that have used these other (i.e., non-EIA) forecasts to compare fixed-price renewable to variable-price gas-fired generation from 2000-2003 have therefore arguably obtained results that are even more "biased" (with respect to fuel price risk) in favor of gas-fired generation than those resulting from EIA-based reference case comparisons.
Potential Explanations for Empirical Premiums
The differences between natural gas forwards and gas price forecasts from November 2000-2003 revealed in the previous section, and the implications such differences hold for resource comparisons, are significant. We are keenly aware, however, that these empirical results are based on limited historical data over a 4-year period characterized by extreme price volatility. In considering whether it is possible to extrapolate our findings, or the implications thereof, into the future, it is important to try to understand the root cause of our empirical findings. At least three different explanations could either partially or wholly account for such sizable differences between natural gas forwards and forecasts: (1) hedging is not costless, and the observed premiums represent the cost of hedging; (2) the forecasts are out of tune with market expectations, so the observed empirical premiums reflect forecast bias; and (3) other data or sampling issues are driving the premium. Below we assess each of these three broad possibilities.
Hedging is Not Costless
This possible explanation can be subdivided into two categories: (1) forward prices are upwardly biased predictors of future spot prices, and (2) transaction costs are significant. The first notion, that forward prices are biased predictors of future spot prices, has been extensively debated in the literature ever since Keynes first introduced the idea of normal backwardation in his 1930 Treatise on Money.
Specifically, Keynes (1930) argued that hedgers who use futures markets to mitigate commodity price risk must compensate speculators for the "insurance" that they provide. In a market dominated by short (long) hedgers, resulting in positive (negative) net hedging pressure, compensation comes in the form of futures prices that are lower (higher) than the expected spot price, thereby enabling speculators to earn a positive return simply by buying (selling) futures contracts (i.e., taking the opposite position from the hedger) and holding that position to maturity (when spot and futures prices presumably converge).
Over the years, a number of studies have attempted -with mixed results -to empirically confirm (or refute) the existence of risk premiums in futures prices by examining the returns to speculators.
12 Much of this work, however, has been based on a strict application of Keynes' theory, which, among other things, assumes that hedgers (i.e., characterized mainly as producers who are long the physical commodity) will be net short futures and that speculators will therefore be net long futures. This results in positive net hedging pressure, and futures contract prices that should, in theory, be below expected spot market prices (i.e., Keynes' normal backwardation). Under this constraint, one need only test for a positive return to holding futures contracts to see whether speculators have earned a risk premium. This is the general approach taken by Telser (1958) and Gray (1961) , who find no evidence of a risk premium in agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat, and cotton.
As noted by Chang (1985) , however, a number of researchers have relaxed this constraint in recognition that both producers and consumers hedge, and that net hedging pressure may therefore not always be positive (i.e., hedgers as a group may not always be net short). Such researchers have generally incorporated information about the aggregate net position of hedgers into their analysis, checking for positive futures returns when net hedging pressure is positive, and negative futures returns when net hedging pressure is negative. Though results remain inconclusive, the relaxation of the assumption that speculators are always net long has generally led to results, as reported in Chang (1985) and Hull (1999) , that are more supportive of Keynes' notion of a risk premium (positive or negative, depending on whether net hedging pressure is negative or positive, respectively) embedded in futures prices. For example, Houthaker (1957), Cootner (1960) , Carter et al. (1983) , Chang (1985) , and de Roon et al. (2000) all relax the assumption that speculators will be net long futures and find empirical evidence of risk premiums embedded in futures prices.
13
12 Due to the historical nature of the debate, which began in the 1930s, most of these studies deal primarily with agricultural commodities. Studies focusing specifically on natural gas and wholesale electricity futures markets, which did not come into being until the 1990s, are discussed later. 13 We again note that none of these studies focus on energy commodities, though de Roon et al. (2000) do include crude and heating oil within a broad array of 20 commodities.
Still other researchers have approached this question from within the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Under CAPM, it is not the variability of prices per se, but rather the correlation of price variability with changes in total wealth that impact the futures premium. Dusak (1973) examined wheat, corn, and soybean futures within the CAPM framework, and found no evidence of either non-zero systematic risk or non-zero futures returns.
14 Hirshleifer (1988) , meanwhile, developed a model whereby the risk premium consists of two terms -a systematic risk term (i.e., related to CAPM) and a term due solely to residual risk (i.e., related to net hedging pressure).
Below we examine in more detail the possibility that either net hedging pressure or CAPMrelated systematic price risk is responsible for the empirical premiums observed in the natural gas market from November 2000-2002, as presented earlier. We then consider the possibilitystill within the context that there is a cost to hedging -that high transaction costs are driving at least a portion of the observed empirical premiums.
Net Hedging Pressure in the Natural Gas Market
A number of studies have examined the efficiency of the natural gas market specifically (i.e., whether gas futures prices are unbiased predictors of subsequent spot prices), and like the broader literature, have found mixed results. Analyzing just the first few years of the NYMEX natural gas futures market (which began in April 1990), Herbert (1993) finds the market to be inefficient (futures prices > realized spot prices), which is perhaps not surprising given the immaturity of the market at that time. With a few more years of price history to examine, Walls (1995) finds the gas futures market to be generally efficient, i.e., gas futures prices were unbiased predictors of subsequent spot prices. More recently, Buchanan et al. (2001) find evidence of positive returns to large natural gas speculators, and Chinn et al. (2001) find that natural gas future prices are a biased and poor predictor of future spot prices. 15 Of course, all of these studies analyze short-term futures contracts, and it is not clear that their results can be extrapolated to the longer-dated futures of interest here.
To test whether the positive premiums (natural gas forward prices that are higher than contemporaneous forecasts of spot prices) observed earlier could be the direct result of negative net hedging pressure, Figure 4 depicts net hedging pressure in the natural gas market from 1999 through 2003. 16 Though largely positive over this period, net hedging pressure has clearly varied 14 Note that these findings do not rule out CAPM as a potentially useful tool for this purpose, since zero systematic risk should lead to a zero risk premium. 15 In addition, though not directly related to natural gas, there has recently been some interesting work on this issue in the wholesale electricity markets. Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) develop an equilibrium model that allows net hedging pressure to be either positive or negative, depending on both the variance and distribution (i.e., skewness) of wholesale electricity prices. In testing their model, they -along with Pirrong and Jermakyan (2001) and Longstaff and Wang (2003) -find evidence of significant positive risk premiums in the PJM day-ahead wholesale electricity markets (i.e., day-ahead forward prices were priced at significantly higher levels than realized spot prices). 16 The data come from the weekly Commitments of Traders reports published by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Traders are classified as "commercial" or "non-commercial" depending on whether their futures positions in a given commodity are used for hedging or speculative purposes, respectively. Thus, while Figure 4 does not support the idea that negative net hedging pressure is directly responsible for the premiums observed earlier, it does show a notable lack of positive net hedging pressure during our sample period. In other words, net hedging pressure appears to provide little support either for or against our specific findings of significant positive premiums in the natural gas market from November 2000 -2003. More generally, however, the fact that net hedging pressure is not uniformly negative suggests that one should not expect -at least on the basis of net hedging pressure -such positive premiums to exist at all times.
Systematic Risk in Natural Gas Prices
Setting aside net hedging pressure and the returns of speculators, what if producers benefited from price volatility, while consumers were hurt by it? In this case, producers would require compensation (i.e., a premium) for being locked into long-term fixed-price contracts, and consumers would be willing to pay such compensation. Economic theory provides some support for this very scenario in the form of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
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While CAPM was originally derived as a financial tool to be applied to investment portfolios, its basic tenet -that an asset's risk depends on the correlation of its revenue stream with variability in the asset-holder's overall wealth -can be applied much more broadly, for example in 17 For a good introduction to CAPM, see Brealey and Myers (1991) . evaluating investments in physical assets such as power plants (Awerbuch 1993 (Awerbuch , 1994 Kahn & Stoft 1993) . Specifically, in the context of natural gas-fired generation, one can think about the correlation between a gas consumer's overall wealth (as proxied by the economy or, more specifically, the stock market) and natural gas prices. If gas prices, and therefore consumer expenditures on gas, rise as the stock market declines (e.g., because rising gas prices hurt the economy), then natural gas is said to have a negative "beta," 18 and is risky to gas consumers and beneficial to gas producers. In other words, at the same time as gas consumers and producers feel the pinch of a weak stock market, expenditures on natural gas also rise, compounding overall wealth depletion among consumers while providing some consolation to producers.
In this specific case, where gas with a negative beta is risky to consumers and beneficial to producers, consumers have an incentive to hedge natural gas price risk, while producers do not. Intuitively, it follows that even if both consumers and producers share identical expectations of future spot gas prices, producers will still require -and consumers will be willing to pay -a premium over expected spot prices in order to lock in those prices today. Both Pindyck (2001) and Hull (1999) mathematically demonstrate this to be the case: when beta is negative, futures prices should, at least theoretically, trade at a premium to expected spot prices.
Thus, if the beta of natural gas is indeed negative, this theory might explain our empirical observations of a positive premium embedded in contract prices. One can test this notion by regressing natural gas price changes against stock market returns. Below we survey past efforts to quantify the beta of natural gas, report results from our own analysis, and then reconcile our regression results with our empirical findings.
Past Estimates of Beta
Literature from the early 1990s supports the existence of a negative beta for natural gas. Kahn and Stoft (1993) regressed spot wellhead gas prices against the S&P 500 using annual data from 1980 through the first 6 months of 1992 and arrived at an estimate of beta of -0.78 (±0.27 standard error). Awerbuch has written several papers advocating the use of risk-adjusted discount rates for evaluating investments in generation assets; in them he usually cites a natural gas beta ranging from -1.25 to -0.5 (Awerbuch 1993 (Awerbuch , 1994 . Awerbuch (1994) also cites another study from 1993 (by Talbot) as having found a natural gas beta of -0.45.
More recent literature surrounding the beta of energy commodities has focused on crude oil, whose price should be at least moderately correlated with natural gas prices. Sadorsky (1999) and Papapetrou (2001) both conclude that there is a negative correlation between changes in oil prices and stock returns (i.e., that oil exhibits a negative beta). Sauter and Awerbuch (2002) provide an extensive survey of the literature regarding oil's impact on both the economy and stock markets, while Awerbuch (2003) estimates that the historical betas of coal, gas, and oil in the European Union are on the order of -0.4, -0.1, and -0.05, respectively.
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On the other hand, Pindyck (2001) -though not specifically investigating beta -notes (without citation) that estimates of beta for crude oil have been in the range of +0.5 to +1.0, and qualitatively explains why one should expect to see positive betas -strong economic growth leads to higher prices for industrial commodities. While qualitatively plausible, this intuition that strong economic growth puts upward pressure on commodity prices (resulting in a positive beta) is no more or less believable than the opposing view that high commodity prices put a damper on economic growth (resulting in a negative beta) -both interpretations merely represent successive phases of the economic cycle.
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Our Estimate of Beta
Seeking an updated estimate of the beta of natural gas, we regressed historical percentage changes in natural gas prices delivered to electricity generators (from the EIA) against historical percentage changes in the S&P 500 index. We choose to work with delivered (rather than wellhead) prices in an attempt to capture the full risk facing gas-fired generators: volatility in both wellhead prices and transportation costs.
21 Like Kahn and Stoft (1993) , we first attempted to use monthly data (going back to January 1979), but were unable to correct for seasonality despite employing several different approaches. As a result, we too retreated to using annual averages, which remove seasonality yet also mask intra-year movements and greatly restrict sample size. We corrected for autocorrelation using the Hildreth-Lu procedure.
Figure 5 graphically displays our estimate of beta over time. The dashed line represents a "cumulative" estimate of beta, resulting from progressively longer-term regressions as one moves forward in time. 22 The gray shaded area represents a 90% confidence interval around our central estimate of cumulative beta. Meanwhile, to illustrate shorter-term variations, the solid line represents a rolling 10-year estimate of beta.
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As shown, our cumulative estimate of beta (the dashed line) is, not surprisingly, fairly stable over time, typically ranging from -0.2 to -0.4, yet coming to rest in 2002 at -0.1 -lower in magnitude than estimates from the early 1990s, 24 but still slightly negative. Even so, the 90% confidence interval, while skewed to the negative side of zero, is fairly wide and does not rule out the possibility of a positive beta, particularly from 1996 on. In fact, it is clear from both the confidence interval and the rolling 10-year estimate of beta that Awerbuch and others who looked at gas betas in the early 1990's were doing so at perhaps the optimal moment to conclude a negative beta. Since that time, the confidence interval has widened considerably -the opposite of what one would expect as sample size increases -and the rolling 10-year beta has oscillated between negative and positive territory. Thus, while the cumulative beta shown in Figure 5 appears to have historically been negative, it would be unwise to conclude that this will always be the case.
Figure 5. Estimate Of Beta Of Natural Gas Delivered To Electricity Generators
Reconciling Our Estimate of Beta with Our Empirical Premiums
Using our sample of forward prices and EIA reference case gas price forecasts, it is possible to back into empirical estimates of the beta for natural gas. These are the specific betas that would be required to fully explain our empirically derived discrepancy between natural gas forward and forecast prices within the context of CAPM. To do this, one must assume that the forward prices are "riskless" (i.e., known in advance and able to be locked in), while the price streams represented by the EIA gas forecasts are "risky" (i.e., merely a forecast and bound to be wrong). One then calculates the present value of both price streams -the forward market price stream using the known "riskless" discount rate (i.e., the U.S. Treasury bill yield at the time), and the EIA forecast price stream using whatever discount rate results in the same present value as the discounted forward market price stream. The difference between the resulting empirically derived risk-adjusted discount rate and the known "riskless" discount rate is then divided by the "market risk premium" -i.e., the historic out-performance of risky assets (stocks) over riskless assets (T-bills) -to yield beta. Performing this exercise using our sample of forward market prices and EIA reference case forecasts, and data on the historic returns of stocks and T-bills going back to 1926 from Ibbotson (2002), 26 we arrive at the various estimates of beta presented in Table 1 . 
The empirical estimates of beta presented in Table 1 are, at least for the longer-term forward contracts, close to the regression estimates presented in Figure 5 , which estimate betas of -0.40 through 2000, -0.26 through 2001, and -0.10 through 2002. This degree of similarity suggests that the fact that longer-term natural gas forwards were priced higher than contemporaneous EIA price forecasts from 2000-2003 may be explained by CAPM. It is also evident, however, that the shorter-term forward contracts yield progressively higher estimates of beta (as high as -2.39 for the November 2001 2-year swap) as the contract term declines, which is largely inconsistent with CAPM.
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In summary, as theoretically appealing as CAPM may seem, we are nevertheless hesitant to place too much faith in CAPM as the sole explanation for our empirical findings, for several reasons. First, it is likely that many gas market participants are unfamiliar with CAPM, making it hard to believe that CAPM is regularly and explicitly incorporated into decision-making processes. Furthermore, CAPM formally requires that each individual's portfolio be fully diversified so that only market risk remains. Kahn and Stoft (1993) note that this may not be the case for the management of gas-producing companies, whose careers and reputation (if not portfolios -witness Enron's retirement plan, which was heavily invested in Enron stock) are closely tied to the profitability of the firm, and who therefore may view gas price volatility as risky even if it is negatively correlated with the market. Finally, if CAPM were a dominant influence, then one would expect past studies of the efficiency of the natural gas futures market to regularly demonstrate a systematic positive difference between futures and realized spot prices. As discussed earlier, this is not the case: some, but not all, of these studies do show evidence of a premium, but in some cases the sign of the premium varies with net hedging pressure, rather than always being positive as would be required under CAPM with a negative beta.
Transaction Costs
Transaction costs provide yet another possible explanation in support of the idea that those hedging gas price risk will incur incremental costs relative to market expectations of future spot 26 Ibottson (2002) calculates that the average compound annual return of T-bills and large stocks (similar to the S&P 500) from 1926 through 2001 is 3.8% and 10.7% respectively, which yields a "market risk premium" (i.e., the average annual return of stocks over bills) of 6.65% (i.e., (1+10.7%)/(1+3.8%)-1 = 6.65%). 27 Perhaps over shorter terms (i.e., 2 years), the comparison of forward market prices to a long-term gas price forecast -which is by nature not very sensitive to changes in spot or short-term futures markets -is less valid.
prices. In commodity markets, transaction costs are manifested in the "bid-offer spread": the spread between the price at which one is willing to buy (bid) and sell (offer) a product. To execute a deal with minimal price risk (i.e., the risk that the market price rises (falls) while one is trying to buy (sell)), one must typically "cross" the bid-offer spread (i.e., pay the offering price (if buying) or accept the bid price (if selling)). Since the "true" market price lies somewhere in between the bid and the offer, crossing the bid-offer spread to execute a deal results in transaction costs being incurred (i.e., paying more, or receiving less, than the "true" market price). For analytical purposes, the size of the transaction cost of dealing (i.e., buying or selling) in a market is typically considered to be half the size of the bid-offer spread in that market (under the assumption that the "true" market price lies half way in between the bid and the offer).
In liquid markets, transaction costs (i.e., bid-offer spreads) are typically very small, and of little concern. In less-liquid markets (or even thinly traded segments of otherwise liquid markets), however, bid-offer spreads can be quite wide, and can have a more significant impact on the cost of transactions.
How high are transaction costs in the long-term natural gas market? While we do not have sufficient data on long-dated forwards to say, we can at least examine bid-offer spreads in the "highly liquid" but shorter-term NYMEX futures market. Figure 6 depicts typical bid-offer spreads over the first 36 contracts, plotted against "open interest" for the entire strip of 72 contracts. 28 For a trade size of 30 contracts executed under normal market conditions, 29 bid-offer spreads in the first four futures contracts (i.e., representing delivery in each of the next four months) are immaterial. Moving beyond these first few very liquid contracts, however, the bidoffer spread increases ten-fold out to 36 months, as liquidity (proxied here by open interest) declines. Beyond these first 36 months (NYMEX gas futures are listed out 72 months), NYMEX gas futures are very thinly traded (open interest essentially drops to zero), making it costly or even difficult to complete a trade of this size (Waller 2002) . 28 "Open interest" represents the number of open or outstanding contracts to the exchange (i.e., contracts that have not been closed out either through an offsetting position or via delivery). Volume -i.e., the number of contracts that changed hands in a given day -is perhaps a better measure of liquidity, though it is also more sensitive to the particular day chosen (e.g., on the Friday before a 3-day holiday weekend, volume may be very light, but open interest will likely be relatively unchanged from normal levels). 29 Trade size and market conditions are relevant because the bid-offer spread will increase with trade size as well as during periods of heightened price volatility. By way of reference, 30 contracts per month is roughly equivalent to the amount of gas needed to fuel an 85 MW combined-cycle gas turbine (heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh) operating at a 70% capacity factor. A gas plant that is twice as large (170 MW) would obviously require twice as many contracts (i.e., 60) to fully hedge gas price risk (or could use the original 30 contracts to hedge half of its risk).
Figure 6. Typical Bid-Offer Spread and Open Interest for NYMEX Natural Gas Futures
Although the bid-offer spread shown in Figure 6 widens dramatically as liquidity declines along the strip, the absolute numbers shown (~1.5% of the contract price at its widest) are admittedly small. That said, the reason the bid-offer spread curve in Figure 6 does not extend beyond 36 months is because beyond this point there is very little liquidity on which to base a reliable estimate. In other words, beyond 36 months, there is not necessarily "a market" per se, and the cost of deal execution depends largely on the ability to locate a willing buyer or seller, which may require significant price concessions at times.
Given the steep slope of the bid-offer spread curve over the first 36 contracts, one would expect deals with longer maturities to have even higher transaction costs. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to confirm this notion. When asked for an indication of a bid-offer spread on a 20-year natural gas swap, however, one Enron gas trader estimated that $0.50/MMBtu would be a reasonable ballpark estimate. While the sheer magnitude of this spread is most likely an indication that no one trades natural gas swaps out that far, it nonetheless exemplifies the significant impact that transaction costs can have in illiquid markets. This impact has likely not been adequately captured by the existing net hedging pressure and efficient market literature cited earlier, which focuses almost exclusively on short-term natural gas futures contracts, rather than the long-term forwards in which we are interested.
The Forecasts Are Out of Tune with Market Expectations
Another possible explanation for our empirically derived premiums between gas forwards and forecasts is related to the forecasts themselves, which may have been biased downwards or otherwise inconsistent with market expectations of spot gas prices from November 2000-2003. Proponents of this explanation might argue that forward prices should represent the market's view of future spot gas prices, and therefore that there is no incremental cost of hedging gas price volatility. Therefore, any real (i.e., not due to data problems) positive difference between gas forwards and gas price forecasts must represent a downward bias in the forecasts relative to the market's view of future spot prices. For example, perhaps the U.S. natural gas industry has recently run into a serious short-term supply constraint that has shifted gas prices (and the market's expectations of future gas prices) into a new regime, and this paradigm has not been reflected in EIA reference case gas price forecasts generated from November 2000-2003; the EIA itself appears to both acknowledge and dispute such a scenario. 30 Furthermore, given that the EIA's reference case gas price forecasts were at the high end of the range relative to other common industry price forecasts over this period, this explanation directly takes issue not only with the EIA reference case forecast, but also with virtually every other publicly available gas price forecast from November 2000-2003. 31 While this explanation is certainly plausible, particularly in light of the considerable market turmoil over this period, it cannot be directly supported or refuted by our data. The EIA's own evaluation of the accuracy of its past AEO forecasts has found that "As a general rule, the rate of increase in nominal energy prices has been overestimated rather than underestimated" (Sanchez 2003) . Specifically, an examination of the accuracy of past gas price forecasts (from the past twenty-one AEOs) reveals that, except in the years 2000-2002, AEO gas price forecasts have consistently overestimated (not underestimated) the actual spot price of gas for the past eighteen years (Sanchez 2003) . While these historic results may in no way be indicative of future trends, the weight of history nevertheless does not lend ready support to the view that the EIA's reference case natural gas price forecast is systematically biased downwards relative to the market's expectation of future natural gas prices.
Another possibility is that the point of comparison is inappropriate altogether; i.e., that the longterm gas-price forecasts discussed herein do not even seek to represent the market's view of future spot gas prices. For example, the EIA notes that its "reference case" forecast assumes that normal inventories and weather, as well as current laws and regulations, will hold throughout the forecast period, and therefore that the reference case forecast does not necessarily reflect what the EIA believes to be "most likely." In fact, the EIA does not assign probabilities to any of the forecasts it generates, so the "high economic growth case" forecast might be considered just as likely as the "reference case" or even "low economic growth case" forecast, for example. Furthermore, by assuming away weather and inventory variability, and possible changes in regulations -all of which have a major impact on prices -the EIA notes that it is not really forecasting prices at all, but rather long-term equilibrium costs. (1) that the EIA believes that its AEO 2004 gas price forecast reflects upwardly revised market expectations concerning future gas prices, and (2) by extension, that the previous three years of AEO gas price forecasts may not have. It is interesting, therefore, that the NYMEX-AEO 2004 comparison shown earlier in Figure 3 reveals a positive price premium that is largely consistent with those found in the previous three years. 31 While it is certainly possible that virtually all gas price forecasts have been biased downwards (relative to market expectations of future spot prices) over the 2000-2003 time period, especially given likely similarities between the various models behind each forecast, the "absolute" nature of this consideration is nonetheless worth noting. If true, this explanation would call into question the use of virtually all long-term gas price forecasts generated from 2000-2003 for any purpose. 32 We note, however, that Annual Energy Outlook uses the term "price" instead of "cost" to describe its forecasts.
While the EIA reference case forecast may not be designed to represent EIA or market expectations of future gas prices, it deserves note that industry participants and energy analysts regularly adopt the EIA reference case projection as a "best estimate" of future energy outcomes; in fact, the EIA itself regularly uses its reference case forecast as the "base-case" forecast when evaluating the cost and impacts of energy policies. Furthermore, Bolinger et al. (2003) demonstrate that some utilities -one important segment of the gas market -are relying on EIA reference case forecasts as a "best estimate" of future gas prices for the purpose of long-term resource planning. Finally, it deserves mention that the above comments relate only to the EIA forecasts, and would not to our knowledge call into question our use of the other gas price forecasts discussed earlier and presented in Bolinger et al. (2003) .
On a related note, some have argued that "reference case" gas price forecasts can best be thought of as modes (i.e., the single scenario that the forecaster believes to be the most likely) rather than means (i.e., a probability weighted average of all possible spot prices), and since market expectations are by definition mean expectations, reference case gas price forecasts cannot represent market expectations. While this argument does not hold for the EIA reference case forecast, which as described above may be neither a mean nor a mode, the implications of this argument are nonetheless worth noting. Specifically, since gas prices are generally believed to be lognormally distributed or positively skewed, the mean must lie above the mode, meaning that true market expectations must be higher than reference case gas-price forecasts (if those forecasts do indeed represent the mode). If this argument is accurate, it might explain some or all of the premium we have observed between forward prices and price forecasts. More importantly, however, this argument calls into question why utilities and others would ever place significant emphasis on the use of reference case gas price forecasts in modeling and planning exercises. By doing so, they would be systematically underestimating the market's expectations of future gas prices, thereby erroneously making gas-fired generation appear to be cheaper than it is likely to be on average (and, by extension, making fixed-price renewables look relatively less attractive than they are).
Other Data Issues are Driving the Premium
A final possible explanation for our findings is simply that our analysis is plagued by data issues that prohibit a meaningful comparison between natural gas forward prices and price forecasts. While we have previously raised the possibility that forecast problems are at least partly responsible for the premium, it is also possible that the other half of the equation -the forward price -is upwardly biased. Or, even if the forward price and price forecast are unbiased, it is possible that potential changes in the market between when the forward prices were sampled and the forecasts were generated could account for some or all of the observed premiums.
The two main potential concerns with our forward price sample -and particularly prices from Enron and Williams, as the NYMEX is a regulated exchange 33 
Conclusions
A comparison of long-term natural gas forward prices and EIA reference case natural gas price forecasts from November 2000-2003 reveals that long-term forward prices have traded above EIA price forecasts during this four-year period. As shown in Figure 3 earlier, the magnitude of the empirically derived premiums ranges from $0.5-$0.8/MMBtu, or 0.4-0.6¢/kWh assuming a highly efficient gas-fired power plant. Furthermore, in recent years the EIA reference case gas price forecasts have typically been higher -and often substantially so -than most other forecasts that are commonly used by utilities and others in resource acquisition, modeling, and planning exercises. Thus, the premiums observed relative to the EIA reference case forecasts would be even larger when comparing forward prices to some of the other forecasts commonly used in the electricity industry.
While one cannot easily extrapolate these findings beyond the time period of our data (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , or to contract terms longer than those examined (i.e., > 10 years), it is at least apparent that utilities and others who have conducted resource acquisition, planning, and modeling studies based on EIA reference case (as well as other) gas price forecasts from November 2000-2003 have arguably produced "biased" results that favor variable-price gas-fired over fixed-price renewable generation, potentially to the tune of ~0.4-0.6¢/kWh levelized. This is because if consumers value price stability, then the cost of fixed-price renewable generation should be compared to the hedged or guaranteed cost of natural gas-fired generation, rather than to projected costs based on uncertain gas price forecasts.
The cause of the premiums is less apparent. We explored three potential explanations for our empirical findings -that hedging is not costless, that the forecasts are biased, and that other data issues are plaguing our analysis -and found each of them to be neither fully satisfying nor easily refutable. Regardless of the explanation, however, the basic implication of our study for renewable energy (or any other energy source that is immune to natural gas fuel price risk) remains the same: one should not blindly rely on gas price forecasts when comparing the costs of fixed-price renewable to variable-price gas-fired generation contracts. If there is a cost to hedging, gas price forecasts do not capture and account for it. Alternatively, if gas price forecasts are at risk of being biased or out of tune with the market, then one certainly would not want to use them as the basis for investment decisions or resource comparisons if a better source of data (i.e., forwards) existed. Accordingly, in virtually all cases, the most comprehensive way to compare the levelized costs of renewable and gas-fired generation would be to use forward natural gas price data as opposed to natural gas price forecasts.
Of course, given widespread credit concerns and the retrenchment of trading desks across the United States in the wake of Enron's collapse, data availability is likely to be an issue. In particular, beyond the six years of publicly available NYMEX futures prices, long-term forward gas price data may be hard to come by. Where forward price data from actual contracts are not publicly available, utilities and policymakers may still have access to (or be in a position to solicit) data that are not in the public domain. Alternatively, natural gas-fired generators may be willing to internalize any cost of hedging (or take on fuel price risk) and offer a long-term fixedprice electricity contract similar to that provided by most renewable generators, thereby obviating the need for a utility or regulator to collect forward gas price data for the purpose of addressing fuel price risk.
Finally, as a last resort, if forward market prices are not available over the planning horizon, and soliciting comparable fixed-price electricity bids from gas-fired generators is not realistic, utilities and others may wish to adjust forecast gas prices upwards to account for the fact that forward prices have, potentially for reasons discussed above, traded above price forecasts over the past four years. While the analysis in this report suggests that an adjustment ranging from $0.5-$0.8/MMBtu (0.4-0.6¢/kWh at a heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh) is a reasonable starting point, we emphasize that these premiums were calculated with respect to EIA reference case price forecasts over the past four years, for terms ranging from 2-10 years. If using a different base gas price forecast, a higher or lower adjustment may be warranted. Likewise, this historically derived premium may well vary in the future, and may vary with contract terms longer than 10 years. For these reasons, this approach is inferior to those previously mentioned, though it may still be superior to simply relying on forecast prices, which -at least over the last four yearshave been shown to be significantly below forward prices.
